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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines how CEO and CFO qualifications affect firm value. Our results indicate that 
companies with managers that have qualifications as prior senior managerial experience of 
CEOs, tenure of CEOs in the current position, MBA degrees of CFOs, and the university where 
the CFOs graduated are associated with higher company valuation, after controlling for firm age 
and industry effects. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
n the last two decades company executive compensation packages have increased tremendously. Large 
multinational companies compete with each other in paying higher and higher salaries and offering 
lucrative stock option packages to top managers. According to Murphy (1999), level of top executive 
compensation between 1992 and 1996 has increased 55% from $2.0 million to $3.2 million. Many researchers ( 
Agrawal and Mandelker (1987), Agrawal and Walking (1994), Boschen and Smith (1995), Defusco, Johnson and 
Zorn (1990), Zhou (1990))  examined CEO and CFO compensation packages across industries and across nations. 
Taking into public sentiment administrators make companies disclose executive pay to the public. Although the 
researchers investigated effects of executive pay on shareholder wealth, the effect of managerial qualifications on 
long-term company value hasn’t been investigated thoroughly.   
  
This study explores whether or not managers with better education and better qualifications increase their 
firm value compared to their colleagues.  We examine the relationship between qualifications and experiences of top 
management and firm market valuation using panel data for 490 companies between 1985 and 2005. We investigate 
how education level and prior work experience of company CEOs and CFOs affect Tobin’s Q values for companies 
in our sample. We gauge the education level by identifying whether or not executives have MBA degrees, and 
whether they graduated from a business school in top 25 of the Financial Times ranking list of business schools. 
Next, we measure work experience by tenure at the current position, and by documenting whether they had prior 
experience as a part of senior management team or as a partner in a law or accounting firm.  We test for mean 
equality between Tobin’s Q values for firms where managers do have versus firms where managers do not have 
each of the outlined qualifications. Next, we analyze the relationship between managerial qualifications and Tobin’s 
Q values using panel least squares estimation method with fixed period effects.  
 
The influence of managerial skills on firm valuation has received limited attention from researchers. At 
present we are only aware of one study by Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) who investigate the effect of managerial 
quality on IPO performance. A parallel stream of studies, for example Lucas (1978), Fama and French (1995), or 
Maksimovic and Phillips (2002), investigates how various firm characteristics affect market valuation of firms. At 
the same time many studies investigate how managerial skill affects mutual fund performance. In most cases the 
results are mixed, for example Switzer and Huang (2007) find significant cross sectional differences in fund mutual 
performance that are attributed to managerial qualifications, while Philpot and Peterson (2006) find little evidence 
that managerial qualifications add value.   
 
I 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – July 2008 Volume 6, Number 7 
130 
The present study adds to this literature in two ways. First, to the best of our knowledge this is the first 
study that investigates the relationship of qualifications and experiences of firm’s top managers and firm valuation 
for mature (non-IPO) firms. Second, we investigate not only whether an executive has an MBA degree, but also in 
what university the CEOs and CFOs obtained education and how the place of study influences firm valuation.  
 
The results of our empirical analysis suggest that managerial qualifications indeed have a bearing on firm 
valuation. First, we analyze the effect of each variable on Tobin’s Q values in univariate framework and discover 
that companies with CEOs and CFOs have MBA degrees and/or graduated from highly reputable business schools 
on average have significantly greater Tobin’s Q values compared with the companies whose managers do not have 
such qualifications. We also find evidence that prior senior management team experience of CFOs is associated with 
significantly higher Tobin’s Q values for their firms. Second, we implement panel data estimation and find that 
managerial qualifications, such as senior experience of CEOs, tenure of CEOs in the current position, MBA degrees 
of CFOs, and the university where the CFOs graduated, significantly affect company valuation, after controlling for 
firm age and industry effects.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data set and section 3 outlines the 
hypotheses and methodology. Section 4 presents our findings, and is followed by the conclusion.  
 
DATA 
 
We include in our analysis panel data on companies in the S&P 500, S&P Midcaps, and S&P Smallcaps 
indices between 1985 and 2005. The data on managerial qualifications are hand-collected from the investor 
information sections of company webpages in 2005. We collect information about tenure, education, and work 
experience for company CEOs and CFOs from their profiles. We also collect information and company age. Finally, 
we collect information on corporate governance, which includes whether or not the current chairman of the board of 
directors is also the CEO, the number of independent directors, and total number of directors on the board of each 
company. See for example Borokhovich et al (1996) for discussion of the benefits of outside directors in the board 
composition.  
 
We require that both the CEO and CFO work for their companies for at least one year, because we expect 
some lag between the time when an executive is hired and the time he or she can make a tangible impact on 
company operations. We find 490 companies that satisfy all data requirements in terms of executive profile 
information, corporate governance, and financial performance variables.  
 
We use the following variables to measure managerial qualifications. For both CEO and CFO we construct 
dummy variables CEOMBA and CFOMBA that indicate whether or not the executive has an MBA. The MBA 
degree should in theory help an executive better understand business situations and make better decisions. Variables 
CEOSCHOOL and CFOSCHOOL show whether the executive graduated from a university on the top 25 business 
school list from Financial Times ranking. More reputable business schools should provide better education and 
greater networking opportunities, and thus a graduate from such a school should be able to make better business 
decisions. Variables CEOPARTNER and CFOPARTNER indicate whether the corresponding executive was earlier 
a partner in a law or accounting firm, as such experience is valuable for top managers who have to routinely deal 
with legal and financial reporting issues that arise from company operations. Variable CEOTENURE and 
CFOTENURE specify the number of years in the current position, a greater number of years will mean that the 
individual has more experience on the job and this should translate into higher managerial qualifications. Finally, 
CEOSENIOREXP and CFOSENIOREXP show whether or not the executive has prior experiences as a part of 
senior management team in any company in his/her career. Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) used a similar set of 
variables to assess the impact of managerial quality on the performance of IPOs.  
 
Table I presents descriptive statistics for the managerial qualifications variables. We find 21 CEOs and 59 
CFOs that have MBA degrees, as indicated by the sum of the variables CEOMBA and CFOMBA. Next, 4 CEOs 
and 13 CFOs had prior experience as a partner in a law or accounting firm, 75 CEOs and 77 CFOs graduated from a 
highly reputable business school. CEOTENURE varies from 4 to 44 years, and CFOTENURE ranges from 1 to 30 
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years, indicating a higher turnover rate for CFOs. Finally, 373 CEOs and 408 CFOs has prior senior managerial 
experience, according to the information available on their profiles.  
 
 
Table I:  Managerial Qualifications 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the measures of CEO and CFO qualifications. Variable CEO(CFO)MBA takes value 
of 1 if an executive has an MBA and zero otherwise. CEO(CFO)PARTNER takes value of 1 if an executive was earlier a partner 
in a law or accounting firm, and zero otherwise. Variable CEO(CFO)SCHOOL takes value of 1 if an executive graduated from a 
university on the top 25 business school list from Financial Times ranking, and zero otherwise. Variable CEO(CFO)TENURE 
specifies the number of years in the current position, as of December 2005. 
 
Panel A:  CEO Qualifications 
 
 CEOMBA CEOPARTNER CEOSCHOOL CEOSENIOREXP CEOTENURE 
 Mean 0.0429 0.0082 0.1531 0.7612 11.5755 
 Median 0 0 0 1 9 
 Maximum 1 1 1 1 44 
 Minimum 0 0 0 0 4 
 Std. Dev. 0.2027 0.0901 0.3604 0.4268 7.6959 
 Sum 21 4 75 373 5672 
Observations 490 490 490 490 490 
 
Panel B:  CFO Qualifications 
 
 CFOMBA CFOPARTNER CFOSCHOOL CFOSENIOREXP CFOTENURE 
 Mean 0.1204 0.0265 0.1571 0.8327 5.8633 
 Median 0 0 0 1 5 
 Maximum 1 1 1 1 30 
 Minimum 0 0 0 0 1 
 Std. Dev. 0.3258 0.1609 0.3643 0.3737 4.4707 
 Sum 59 13 77 408 2873 
Observations 490 490 490 490 490 
 
 
Table II presents descriptive statistics for the variables that proxy for quality of corporate governance. In 
382 out of 490 companies in our sample the CEOs are also Chairs of the board of directors, as indicated by the sum 
of variable CHAIRCEO. Next the degree of board independence measured by INDEPDIRPERCENT ranges from 
0.22 to 0.93 with mean value of 0.7132.  
 
Next, we present industry composition of the sample in Table III. The most represented industry sector in 
our sample is Consumer Discretionary with 100 firms out of 490. The least represented sector is Telecommunication 
Services, which has only three firms that satisfies all data requirements.  
 
In order to investigate the effect of managerial qualifications on firm performance and market valuation for 
the companies, we collect industry classification, balance sheet, and market valuation data from S&P Compustat 
between 1985 and 2005. We collect data on Total Assets, Shareholders’ Equity, Shares Outstanding, Price per 
Share, and Total Debt for the firms. We use these data to construct Tobin’s Q as a measure of market valuation, we 
calculate it as follows: Tobin’s Q = (Market value of equity +Book Value of Total Debt)/ Book Value of Total 
assets.  
 
Table IV presents company age and market performance measures. For companies in our sample, Tobin’s 
Q averages at 2.0635 and ranges from 0.2330 to 14.5920. Median size as measured by Total Assets is $1,453.53 
million and it ranges from $11.42 million to $750,507 million. Finally, firm age varies from 3 to 222 years old, with 
mean age 45.4 years, and median size as measured by Total Assets is $9,894.0 million. Thus, we have a sample of 
companies with very diverse market valuations, sizes, and histories.  
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Table II:  Governance Proxies 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the company governance proxies. Variable CHAIRCEO takes value of 1 if the CEO 
is also the chairman of the board of directors for the company. Variable INDEPDIRPERCENT indicates the percentage of 
directors who are not corporate officers. 
 
 
 CHAIRCEO INDEPDIRPERCENT 
Mean 0.7796 0.7132 
Median 1 0.73 
Maximum 1 0.93 
Minimum 0 0.22 
Std. Dev. 0.4149 0.1439 
Sum 382 349.49 
Observations 490 490 
 
 
Table III:  Industry Distribution 
 
This table presents the industry distribution of firms in out sample. 
 
 
Industry sector Number of firms 
Materials 39 
Consumer Discretionary 100 
Consumer Staples 23 
Health Care 51 
Energy 20 
Financials 71 
Industrials 83 
Information Technology 73 
Telecommunication Services 3 
Utilities 27 
Total: 490 
 
 
HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The quality of managers can affect financial performance and subsequent market valuation of companies in 
a variety of ways. Higher quality managers may be able to select better projects, and to implement them more 
effectively. Next, higher quality managers may be able to find a more appropriate combination of debt and equity in 
the firm’s capital structure and thus lower company cost of capital. Finally, higher quality managers may be able to 
better convey (i.e. ‘certify”) the intrinsic value of the firm to the capital markets. See for example Allen and 
Faulhaber (1989), Chemmanur (1993), Welch (1989), and Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) for the discussion of this 
certification effect on IPO performance. Because of all the reasons outlined above, we expect that higher quality 
managers may improve market valuation of their firms.  
 
We measure the unobservable managerial quality with the proxy variables that indicate whether not an 
executive has an MBA degree, graduated from a highly reputable business school, has extensive financial reporting 
and legal experience prior to becoming the company executive, has prior experience of working as a part of a senior 
management team, and tenure in a current position. We expect a positive relationship between each measure of the 
managerial quality and market valuation.  
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UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
To examine the link between managerial quality and company valuation we first compute Tobin’s Q annual 
averages for firms where CEOs or CFOs exhibit certain qualifications and compare them with the Tobin’s Q annual 
averages for firms where CEOs or CFOs do not have such qualifications. In particular, we separate firms based on 
whether their CEOs or CFOs have MBA degrees, graduated from Financial Times top 25 business schools, have 
experience as a partner on a law or accounting firms, or have senior management team experience prior to becoming 
the CEO or CFO.   
 
Next, we use seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) method to estimate the system of equations specified 
as follows: 
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where Qt,D=0 is average Tobin’s Q value in year t across companies where the executive in question (CEO or CFO) 
does not have the qualification (i.e. CEOMBA=0), Qt,D=1 is average Tobin’s Q value in year t across companies 
where the executive in question (CEO or CFO) does have the qualification (i.e. CEOMBA=1), c(1)and (2) are 
constants and ε1,t and ε2,t are regression residuals. We estimate two regressions on the mean for firms with and 
without a given qualification, and the SUR method allows us to directly test using Wald test whether c(1) equals to 
c(2). We expect that if higher quality managers indeed improve firm investments, financing, operations, and investor 
recognition, then it should be the case that c(2)>c(1).  
 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
To test the relationship between managerial quality and company valuation we estimate the flowing 
equation using panel least squares method with fixed period effects and White’s correction for heteroskedasticity. 
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where CEOMBA and CFOMBA = 1 when an executive has an MBA and zero otherwise, CEOSCHOOL and 
CFOSCHOOL = 1 when an executive graduated from  the top 25 Financial Times business school and zero 
otherwise, CEOPARTNER and CFOPARTNER = 1 when an executive has previous experience as a partner in an 
accounting or law firm and zero otherwise, CEOSENIOREXP and CFOSENIOREXP = 1 when an executive has 
previous experience as a part of top management team in any company and zero otherwise, CEOTENURE and 
CFOTENURE is the number of years the officer worked in current position. The other independent variables are not 
related to the quality of management and are used as control variables for other aspects of firm quality. 
COMPANYAGE is the number of years since the company started operations or was incorporated, whichever 
occurred first. CHAIRCEO =1 when the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0 otherwise, and 
INDEPDIRPERCENT is the percentage of independent directors on the board.  
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Figure I 
 
This figure presents the time trajectories of annual cross sectional mean values for Tobin’s Q values for firms whose CEOs and 
CFOs have MBA and SCHOOL dummy variables equal to 0 or 1. 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Figure I presents time trajectories of annual averages for Tobin’s Q values for firms with CEOs (CFOs) 
have both MBA and SCHOOL dummy variables equal to 0 or 1. A casual inspection of the graphs reveals that in 
almost all years higher average Tobin’s Q values were displayed by companies whose managers have an MBA and 
graduated from a highly reputable business school. Thus, it appears that companies managed by better educated 
managers were indeed valued higher.  
 
  To formally examine the relationship between managerial qualifications and firm valuation we estimate 
system (1) for the CEO’s and CFO’s: MBA&SCHOOL, MBA, SCHOOL, PARTNER, and SENEXP and test 
whether intercepts for both equations are equal. The test results are presented in Table 5 show that for variables 
CEOMBA×CEOSCHOOL, CFOMBA×CFOSCHOOL, CEOMBA, CFOMBA, CEOSCHOOL, CFOSCHOOL, and 
CFOSENEXP the parameter estimates are as predicted, c(2)>c(1), and significantly different from each other. In 
particular, for variables CEOSCHOOL we have c(1)=2.0329, which is less than c(2)=2.1350, as predicted. The chi 
square statistic for the coefficient equality test is 13.7153 and highly significant. For variable CEOSENEXP the 
coefficient estimates are as predicted but we cannot reject the null hypothesis of coefficient equality c(1)=c(2).  
 
  For variables CEOPARTNER and CFOPARTNER the coefficient estimates are the opposite from 
predicted, it appears that companies where a CEO or a CFO has never been a partner on average are valued higher. 
We hypothesize that this result may be due to a small number of companies where the executives have such 
experience: in our sample there are only 4 companies where the CEO was a partner and only 13 companies where 
the CFO was  
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Table IV:  Company Performance 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the company characteristics. They include Tobin’s Q, Total Assets, and Company 
Age. Tobin’s Q = (Market value of equity +Book Value of Total Debt)/ Book Value of Total assets.  Descriptive statistics for 
Tobin’s Q and Total Assets are calculated using panel data between 1985 and 2005. Company Age is reported as of December 
2005. 
 
 
 TOBINS Q Total Assets Company Age 
Mean 2.0635 9427.49 45.4 
Median 1.6095 1453.53 32 
Maximum 14.5920 750507.00 222 
Minimum 0.2330 11.42 3 
Std. Dev. 1.4070 38612.51 37.33 
Obs. 2073 2073 490 
 
 
Table V:  Univariate Analysis 
 
This table presents estimation results for the system of equations (1). We estimate two regressions on the mean for firms with and 
without a given managerial qualification using the SUR method, and directly test using Wald test whether c(1) equals to c(2). 
 
 
CEOMBA× 
CEOSCHOOL 
CEOMBA 
 
CEOSCHOOL 
 
CEOPARTNER 
 
CEOSENEXP 
 
C(1) 2.0388*** 2.0447*** 2.0329*** 2.0505*** 2.0426*** 
 (24.831) (24.606) (24.745) (24.870) (27.039) 
C(2) 2.5263*** 2.1563*** 2.1350*** 1.8083*** 2.0498*** 
 (20.429) (27.264) (24.602) (19.411) (23.969) 
      
Wald C(1)=C(2) 32.4263*** 3.7907* 13.7153*** 9.2481*** 0.0654 
      
 
CFOMBA× 
CFOSCHOOL 
CFOMBA 
 
CFOSCHOOL 
 
CFOPARTNER 
 
CFOSENEXP 
 
C(1) 2.0129*** 2.0146*** 2.0269*** 2.0532*** 1.8158*** 
 (26.828) (27.043) (27.096) (24.652) (34.491) 
C(2) 2.5751*** 2.2998*** 2.1570*** 1.8600*** 2.0985*** 
 (12.158) (15.035) (17.084) (27.764) (23.250) 
      
Wald C(1)=C(2) 13.8411*** 9.3906*** 4.9540** 8.3685*** 25.1354*** 
*** indicates 1% significance, ** indicates 5% significance, * indicates 10% significance 
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Table VI:  Multivariate Analysis 
 
This table presents estimation results for equation (2) using panel least squares method with fixed period effects and White’s correction for heteroskedasticity. 
 
 
Constant 
CEOMBA 
 
CEO 
SCHOOL 
CEOPARTNER 
 
CEO 
SENIOREXP 
CEOTENURE 
 
COMPANYAGE 
  
0.772*** 0.008 0.031 0.143 0.088* 0.113*** 0.019  
(3.710) (0.071) (0.647) (0.785) (1.779) (4.134) (1.162)  
        
 
CFOMBA 
 
CFO 
SCHOOL 
CFOPARTNER 
 
CFO 
SENIOREXP 
CFOTENURE 
 
CHAIRCEO 
 
INDEPDIR 
PERCENT 
 0.243* 0.473*** 0.033 0.001 0.005 0.032 -0.189 
 (1.947) (3.367) (0.523) (0.024) (0.168) (0.731) (-1.318) 
        
Materials 
 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
Consumer 
Staples 
Health Care 
 
Energy 
    
0.500*** 0.914*** 1.305*** 1.823*** 0.539***    
(4.944) (8.600) (8.598) (9.534) (3.850)    
      Model characteristics 
Financials 
 
Industrials 
 
Information 
Technology 
Utilities 
   
Total (unbalanced) 
observations: 2071 
0.238*** 1.123*** 1.473*** 0.188  Adjusted R2 0.1772 
(2.115) (6.070) (6.279) (1.555)  Akaike info criterion 3.3470 
      Log likelihood -3422.784 
      F-statistic 11.615 
Period fixed (dummy variables):YES    Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 
*** indicates 1% significance, ** indicates 5% significance, * indicates 10% significance 
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a partner in a law or accounting firm. In addition, this result may be due to the fact that univariate analysis ignores 
other factors that may be contributing to market valuation. To summarize, most of the evidence uncovered by 
univariate analysis points that companies run by managers with higher qualifications tend to also have higher market 
valuations. 
 
Table VI presents the results of multivariate analysis. Examination of estimation results for equation (2) 
underscores that firms with more qualified top management have also higher market valuation as measured by 
Tobin’s Q. In particular, we discover that firms have significantly higher Tobin’s Q if they have CEOs who have 
prior senior managerial experience, CEOs who served longer in the current position, and CFOs who have MBA 
degrees and who graduated from a top business school. For example, the parameter estimate for variable 
CEOSENIOREXP is 0.088 and is significant at 10% level with the corresponding t-value of 1.779. The coefficients 
for CFOMBA and CFOSCHOOL are also significant at 10% and 1%, respectively.    
 
We find that for equation (2) the coefficient estimates for both CEOPARTNER and CFOPARTNER 
variables are positive, as predicted, although they are not statistically significant. It is possible that our earlier 
findings for this variable given by system (1) estimates are driven by limitations of the univariate analysis.  Overall, 
evidence from multivariate analysis presented in Table VI once again suggests that companies whose managers have 
higher qualifications are valued more than the companies whose managers do not have such qualifications. We 
argue that higher firm valuation is a result of superior managerial skills employed by better educated and more 
experienced executives.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study examines the relationship between qualifications of top management and firm market valuation. 
We study how education and work experience of company CEOs and CFOs affect Tobin’s Q values for companies. 
We compare average Tobin’s Q values for firms where managers have qualifications and experiences versus firms 
where managers do not have them. We also analyze the relationship between managerial qualifications and Tobin’s 
Q values using panel least squares estimation.  
 
Our analysis unveils a number of interesting results. We find that companies whose CEOs and CFOs have 
MBA degrees and/or graduated from highly reputable business schools on average have significantly higher firm 
valuations compared with the companies whose managers do not have these qualifications. We also find that prior 
senior management team experience of CFOs is associated with significantly higher Tobin’s Q values for their 
firms. Finally, we find that such managerial qualifications as senior experience of CEOs, tenure of CEOs in the 
current position, MBA degrees of CFOs, and the university where the CFOs graduated significantly improve 
company valuation, after controlling for firm age and industry effects.  
 
These results support human capital theory that superior qualifications and experience will improve 
manager’s productivity by helping them to choose better investment projects and to implement them more 
effectively. They are also in line with predictions of certification theory (i.e. Chemmanur (1993) that higher quality 
managers help reduce information asymmetry and better convey the intrinsic value of the firm to the capital markets. 
Overall, we find positive effect of top managerial qualifications on firm valuation. 
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